200 Years Is Not Enough: Revolutionary Cells In The Post-Fordist
Era

     For about two years now, since the demise of the anti-
nuclear/anti-Wackersdorf movement and the May 1st actions in
Kreuzberg (during which there were heavy riots), we have been
pressed, like other groups, with the question of what terms and
developments are of leftist politics in West Germany and in West
Berlin, and what our share is therein.
     In response to the question of the causes of the present lack
of any new perspectives, we have become a bit hesitant. When we
compare the present discussions to those of the past 10-15 years,
there is little difference to be seen. We are of the presumption
that symptoms are often perceived as causes, whereby the issue of
the incorporation of the Left into political-economic relationships
disappears under the table, and thus leftist politics remain
compulsively without engagement.
     In any case, we see ourselves as presently confronted with a
task whose dimensions spiralled above our heads. In the attempt,
not only to develop a militant (cell) perspective, but to also
explore uncultivated fields of theory, we were filled with such un-
natural perspectives that we failed miserably. The same
circumstances which dictate the crisis on the Left are also
affecting those seeking a way out of the crisis. Also of importance
is the break in any continuity to our discussion and the lack of
any available structures wherein such a discussion can take place.
Recently, the number of existing radical publications has declined,
and so has the number of publications which are willing, and able,
to print discussions of dubious legality given article 129a. The
repression over the last few years against leftist publications
seems to be taking its toll, and that is not due to individual
editors, but rather is due to the fact that, with a few minor
exceptions, there is no collective responsibility for the
dissemination of radical publications.
     The criminalization of militant ideas seems to have ceased
being a concern to leftist minds; at the same time, the actual
publication of militant writings has sharply declined. As a
concrete example: handbooks for practical forms of resistance. In
this area the situation has been particularly poor over the last
few years. The fetishizing in and the equally dangerous
uncarefulness of many handbooks (for example, on how to saw down
power-lines) has resulted in much political and personal damage.
Nevertheless, the need remains for a discussion of better methods
of resistance, because practical resistance must not remain a myth
or a secret science.
     The campaign around the trial of Ingrid Strobl, for example,
has, to a large extent, brought the notions of gene-technology,
sex-tourism, and refugee politics to the fore. As far as all this
is concerned, the forces of repression were dealt a blow in her
case. But they achieved their end nonetheless: practical resistance
has been at a virtual standstill since the house-searches of
December 18, '87.
     But how could things be otherwise? If a group were ever to
seize the initiative to once more leave behind a bomb in the
offices of Lufthansa, then they must rely on handbook instructions
which are already years old, if they manage to get their hands on
such a handbook in the first place. In such handbooks, RZ
recommends that we use industrial or military explosives. But who
of us has available contacts with weapon-dealers, and who of us is
able to break into military depots? There's always the old
herbicide chemicals for use as explosives, perhaps? Well, we don't
know whether anyone has noticed, but that stuff is hardly available
anymore; at best, one can get it in some remote village, where
people haven't yet been alerted to the fact that folks can make
bombs out of the stuff, and where the shopkeeper won't look deep
into your eyes and say, "Now, don't do anything stupid with this,
okay?".
     Except for Radikal, whose levels of distribution leave much to
be desired, we can't think of any publication which can print such
action tips and instructions without sowing the seeds of its own
demise. And all of this apart from the question of whether there
are even any groups left who are busy developing new techniques and
technologies.
     And now we have reached the second big problem, why do we see
ourselves placed in the position of developing an illegal, militant
resistance? It is no longer immediately obvious that such actions
as a whole are recognized as something very relevant to oneself,
and as something for which leftist politics as a whole will claim
responsibility. Groups remain stuck in a given theme and work for
a half a year on theory, only then to conclude that there are no
practical possibilities for translating this into mass-militancy.
They disband themselves, find each other once again in new or old
groups, and then allow a new theme to fail because of the same old
mistakes.
     We have as an ideal notion that a movement, via a collective
decision-making process, could decide when and where the militant
actions of small groups are useful and also provide the necessary
structures to carry out such actions. This was still possible
during the anti-nuclear movement in 1986. At a given moment, a
common political ground could be found after clandestine actions
were taken, even when no structures existed which could express
this fact to the outside world, and when carrying out such actions,
people relied upon the existence of capable support groups (would
the BUKO, a coalition of action groups in Neurenberg, rally in
support?).
     It is, of course, the question, whether a similar clandestine
process, which is currently necessary, is now possible given the
State's repression. It is worth trying, in any case. Back in 1986,
the communiques of responsible groups often lacked any mention of
if and how various actions were to be carried out. Only when the
actions were great successes (Adler) or horrible failures (Kuebel,
an action during which faeces were thrown into an expensive
establishment) were the actions discussed, acclaimed, or criticized
afterwards. But if the decision, to recognize militant actions as
necessary and how to carry them out, is resigned to a purely
individual one, then the conditions for developing massive
resistance by various, small groups are not good. And what's more:
when individualization is in question, the commitment to resistance
becomes an individual's own question, one which can only be
answered 'yes' to by those people who can look back upon past
experiences, discussions, and relations, and those people must then
be able to bear the consequences of their actions by themselves.
     In any case, in the last few years there have, at least,
appeared some books and articles to which we could orient ourselves
and work with, and these saved us lots of time and solved lots of
formulation problems better than we could have done ourselves.
Included in this group of publications: "The New History of
Capitalism" by Joachim Hirsch and Rolan Roth, which should be found
in every living-room; the "Ganz von Unten" contribution of Karl-
Heinz Roth in Konkret 6/89 in relation to the Kuebel-discussion;
the "From Riot to Revolution" piece (May 1, '89 document); the
Freiburger piece "Out of Isolation, Into the Neighbourhoods?!" in
the latest Unzertrennlich; and finally a number of old RZ-texts,
especially "In a Time of Danger and High Emergency, the Middle-
Ground Brings Death".
     Much of what we include here is not new. What's new is the
connection, wherein we, coming from many different angles, offer
various hypotheses, and the conclusions we draw from these. On the
other hand, for example, we think in contrast to Radikale Linke,
that it's not sufficient to work on theories of capitalist
modernization for the time being. But on the other hand, in
contrast to the autonomes, we think that the present structures of
basically open forms of militant resistance are not strong enough
to offer any decisive form of resistance to the process of
restructuring. We also don't believe that the attempt to build up
better structures from inside will lead to anything more than
turning about in circles and wasting away. One cannot improve on
structures which can't be developed further.
     We don't figure in with the traditional side of RZ. If we make
clear in this article the possibilities for illegal resistance, we
won't be merely clothing our old, worn-out approaches with new
arguments. Just as with other forms of resistance, so it is too
with illegal and armed forms of struggle, namely that situations
change and that once-adopted decisions cannot be binding for all
times.
     As far as this is concerned, this piece is also meant to add
to the discussion around the Radikale Linke, and even if we can't
be present in person at the meetings and congresses, we hope
nonetheless that our ideas will be present in people's minds.
     The project Radikale Linke is, as we know, not the result of
our own strengths, but rather the result that the failure of the
united leftist offensives in the past years. In any case it can't
claim to offer any mass-perspective. That also applies to the RZ
and the autonomes, even though the autonomes falsely claim that
they are the only ones who can still successfully mobilize and that
they also offer a political perspective. But even a project born
out of a situation of weakness is a step in the right direction,
because usually in times of crisis the Left has been characterized
by its sectarian squabbling and the struggle of everyone against
each other.
     (Therefore, the name Radikale Linke is necessarily arbitrary.
You could first ask yourself, how a group, whose initial planning
meetings were secret and elitist, can claim to speak for a unified,
radical left. And secondly, the term 'radical left' seems to imply
that there exists a leftist tendency which does not aim at the
roots of social ills. In a time of confusion of terms, it is
difficult, but necessary, to retain a sense of certainty. Along
with that, however, we mustn't let the countless Greens and SPD-ers
on the subjective left fail to be made to realize that they are
anything other than mere liberals.)
     Still, we have our doubts whether anything practical will come
of this project. Of course it is important, after years of unbroken
discussion related solely to practical actions, to once again
concern ourselves with various theoretical positions. But still
there's that fear that the project will sell-out the question of
practical militancy, leaving it only to those who can and want to
leave it to other segments of the Left.
     Rainer Trompert and Thomas Ebermann write in their "Design for
Certain Political Fundamentals in Radikale Linke": "We would like
to insert into daily politics a number of common views, and also
mobilize around relevant events, because we realize that
theoretical ideas without interventionist practice remain void." In
short, the theoretical discussion is not to be used to develop its
own praxis, but rather the theoretical positions are to be fitted
to an existing praxis. It is to feared, however, that this will
mean an intervention into other groups and movements. We propose
that with such a project such as Radikale Linke, that the involved
groups reach as much of a position of consensus as possible, so
that in moments of crisis, such as when shots were fired on
Startbahn West, groups can remain politically united, instead of
some groups having to remove themselves. The article in
Arbeiterkampf from last October shows a different tendency however,
namely that the project will become a game for those who love to
argue ad nauseam about theory to the point of losing any practical
relevance.
     It is now important, not only to discuss the political
advances of the past few years, but also personal contributions to
the resistance. The already existing schism between theoreticians
and people of the deed, and the hierarchical tendencies associated
with such a schism, has become worsened over the last few years.
Opposed to one another stands theoretical radicalism without any
militant praxis, and militant praxis seemingly devoid of theory.
"It seems to be the case that the critique of weapons and the
critiquing weapons themselves exclude one another, at least if you
look at the actors/actresses involved" (Ingrid Strobl). The
unaccounted-for militancy in Kreuzberg on May 1, and the nice
eloquence without any political influence of the eco-socialists and
the fundis in the Greens, seems to indicate that the schism is
wider than ever. The explanation of this is not to be found in a
quest for influence versus a militancy-fetish, even if both are met
with frequently. Differences in socialization and variously
developed fears lead to different positions, even on the Left:
"Talking, explaining, and lecturing are clever things which the
members of the 'new middle-class' have, in general, learned. At the
same time, however, they are things which are necessary when
working in political groups. Another acquired trait is that of
'restraining one's temper'. That means developing thought- and
behaviour-patterns which orientate the personal contributions, not
towards the short-term, but rather towards the long-term goals."
(RZ-Aug. '83). This is, in fact, not so much concerned with
individual responsibility: "The contradictory situations which men
and women face when struggling against the established order are
numerous indeed. As for reconciling the pen and sword, they can
only expect this of themselves." (Ingrid Strobl). This does not
mean getting Thomas Ebermann in a ski-mask, or getting the
autonomes into library reading rooms. Rather, this is about making
both sides of this existing schism aware of the schism's existence,
even if it can't yet be reconciled, and to thereby recognize the
limits of their respective endeavours, whether they be theoretical
or practical.
     (Perhaps we've been grumbling too much, since the Left is
always more self-critical and because we often leave 'positive
thinking' to the esoterics. Nevertheless, the project Radikale
Linke is one of the most important initiatives of the moment, too
important, in fact, for the Left to ignore it.)
     This matter is of concern to us. We must eliminate this
'division of labour' schism as much as possible and to give it
practical form, and to bring all of this line with our opinions and
experiences.

Post-Fordism

     In this next section, we shall discuss the political-economic
developments of the last few years. We'll confine ourselves to a
short summary; we couldn't say any it better than Hirsch/Roth.
Whether we are even dealing with "post-Fordism" (Hirsch/Roth) or
rather with an "intensified Fordism" (Karl Heinz Roth) is something
we'll leave to the part-time economists. Above all, we are
concerned with the question; what effect will these changing
political and economic relationships have on leftist politics?
     According to Hirsch and Roth, the crisis which caused a
decline in capitalist profits at the end of the 70's had two
causes. On the one side, the 'Taylorist labour process' reached its
productive limits, and its inflexible and out-dated technological
components made a swift conversion impossible. Other attempts to
restore profits through rationalization, such as massive lay-offs,
failed. And on the other side, the production-line created a new
type of worker, who, through individual forms of resistance, fought
against monotony and alienation. Calling in sick, effecting
sabotage, acting nonchalant, and possessing a generally low morale
all damaged the production process, which is 'supposed' to run
smoothly. The fought-for system of social welfare meant that wages
were relatively high and could not be suddenly reduced given
existing contract agreements. In this way, Fordism ran itself into
the ground.
     One important stabilizing characteristic of Fordism, namely
the intertwining of the state and its industries, seemed, at the
time, to be inflexible. At the same time, the increasing inter-
connectedness of the world economy limited the effectiveness of
national initiatives to halt the crisis. What the world economy
even further destabilized was and is the competition between
industrialized nations, as markets became flooded with products
(from chips to ships) from the quickly industrialized nations, and
along with this is the much discussed debt-crisis.
     Even the ideological problems surrounding mass-consumption
were intensified. The automobile, the gem of Fordism, the symbol of
mass well-being, suddenly became the cause of congested streets,
millions of accident victims, and perishing forests. A new
environmental-consciousness and the potent movement which grew out
of this commanded the state to recognize these problems (ie, the
scaling-back of the nuclear-energy program, the failure of Kalkar).
No longer was consumption gratuitous; consumer organizations began
distributing information on almost all available products, on
everything from washing detergents to hazardous materials in food.
     On different fronts, however, there were ways to head off the
crisis:

Technological: Micro-electronics and bio- and gene-technology are
not only part of the expanding sector of post-Fordism, but they
also offer possibilities for social control and labour regulation.
(We needn't say any more about this, as there whole books full of
such information; we recommend people read Thomas Muntzer's
"Revolutionary Virus" in Radikal, 135). In this category one could
also name eco-technology.

The Increasing Flexibility in the Labour Market and the High
Unemployment Among Women: The struggle of the 60's and 70's was
more difficult to suppress than is now the case. A high level of
unemployment is, thus, not only the result of computerization, but
also a conscious goal.
     But present labour-relations are being turned upside down
wherever possible through promises and deals, and the labour
process is being made more flexible. Whereas temporary-labour
forces, during Fordism, were an expression of a refusal to be tied
to a fixed career, under post-Fordism they are seen as an ideal: no
social security, unqualified workers (lower wages, therefore), and
flexible but nonetheless dependent, workers.
     At the same time, the social welfare system in West Germany
has been dismantled more fully in comparison with other nations:
reductions in unemployment benefits and child-care, lower student
grants, and a reorganization of the health system have been but a
few consequences. It is no longer possible to refuse all forms of
work and still be able to exist on unemployment benefits. That
means a partially voluntary, unintegrated sector of the population
is being forced into wage-labour and thus into the system.
     Even the role of unions has changed: under Fordism they were
still seen as social partners (which didn't mean that individual
employers necessarily liked them), whereas now their power is being
severely limited. At the moment when the unions, through their
years of loyal cooperation with the state, nonetheless see through
the attacks being directed against them, and recognize at the same
time how little in struggle with the state they really are, because
they have willingly tamed themselves all along, then their future
role becomes, from the outside, fundamentally different. The
external forms have remained unchanged (for example, the right to
strike), but their practical opportunities are now severely
limited. And supposing the unions, under pressure from the
restructuring, were ever to radicalize society, then they would
find the repression measures already in place. The political
radicalization of the DKB is hardly to be expected, even more
unlikely would be their advocating the use of illegal action-
methods. And ordinary financial questions (such as compensating for
pay during a lock-out) make this situation even more dire.
     The longed-for stratified society, one in which individual
roles and positions are clearly spelled out, won't be static.
Rather, it will be a society in which everyone can, at any moment,
be thrust either up or down the social ladder, creating an all-
pervasive sense of angst.

Ideological: "In opposition to the mass of poorly paid, flexible,
and uncertain labourers stand a small number of privileged
employees and self-sufficient people. In contrast to years past,
the number of 'typical' workers with steady jobs and steady incomes
is declining. Along with this has come two separate consumption-
patterns." (Freiburger paper in Unzertrennlich, 11/12)
     Discount-stores and warehouses on the one hand, boutiques and
luxury department stores for the yuppies on the other. But this
means more than just a collection of expensive stores and cafe's.
A specific yuppie-culture has come into being, a culture which
possesses a definite hegemony and one which performs a leading role
in society. The discovery of the yuppie-word zeitgeist actually
means that their culture is the zeitgeist and has, since 1968,
taken over the dominant cultural avant-garde from the Left. It is
important, however, to distinguish between the various instance of
yuppie-culture and its actual social content. The problem isn't so
much that this culture has taken over from both the traditional
German 'flower-curtain culture' as well as from the counter-
culture. Even less of a problem is the development of a culinary
culture apart from wiener schnitzels and spaghetti and tomato
sauce. The problem is, that this culture of the few is based on the
exploitation of others and the disturbing of social structures, and
that its psychological success lies in its sublimation of personal
and political defeats through conscious competition. This
illustrates how fatal it is to confuse the struggle for culture
(both in terms of art and manner of living) with the struggle for
survival. Their immanent problems (collectives, relationships) have
not been solved or collectively examined, and no new cultural forms
have arisen in their place. This also explains why leftist politics
has lost its appeal. The trend (nay, compulsion) towards leftist
uniformity stands in contrast to the individual adoption of yuppie-
style and at the same time its ideology.
     Yuppie-ideology means the same-old false-gods of money,
career, and power dressed in new wrappings. The old version (the
cold, boring bureaucrat, married with children, inflexible and
conservative) is no longer adequate to attract post-Fordist kids
into the ruling class. Creativity, seeming autonomy, eloquent
criticism, and the take-over of cultural freedom since '68 has made
it possible for yuppie-ideology to deeply force its way into
leftist circles.
     At the same time, these abilities are necessary to be able to
function under post-Fordism. It is just this ability to make
eloquent criticisms which has made it possible for profit-making
concerns to have forced themselves into the environmental debate,
and it is necessary, both internally and externally, to be able to
correct mistakes made in the competitive market. Creativity helps
one to discover new markets and to develop new technologies.
Autonomy is the expression of individualization and competition;
cultural freedoms compensate for the oppression of the workplace.
These leftist characteristics have remained, namely critique,
autonomy, and creativity. What has vanished, however, is
solidarity, clarity, and attack. One can only guess what will
result from this. The attempt to compensate for past societal
failures through the search for individual happiness is at best
ambiguous. At the same time, we are losing the very instruments
needed to clear up uncertainties - and then, of course, esoteric
concerns make their appearance.
     When examining this alongside leftist tradition, one can see
the results. While the members of the 'old' ruling class have
retreated to their suburban villas, the members of the 'new' ruling
class are heading for neighbourhoods such as Kreuzberg and
Schoeneberg, neighbourhoods which they are transforming into live-
work-recreation-consumption areas. How this all looks is well
known. Houses become more expensive, expensive shops and cafe's
appear, redeveloping occurs to bring in newer, more expensive
houses, and all of this results in the removal of the original
shops and residents. Poverty is needed as a picturesque facade
('dining in the Bronx of Hamburg') to make one's own advances
visible and to make it possible to flirt with living in 'dangerous
neighbourhoods'. Eventually this becomes tiresome, and the push for
redevelopment and gentrification increases. Out of these motley
areas a city neighbourhood is soon constructed, a neighbourhood
wherein the poor can't possibly exist and wherein all the
structures of resistance have been removed.
     In this way, cities are restructured and stratified. In West
Germany this has taken place along a north-south line, with the
high-tech centers in Baden-Wuertenberg and around Munich, the
banking center Frankfurt, and finally smaller centers, including
the heavily subsidized West Berlin. Along with these are the
traditional well-off area (Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, with their ship
industries) and the west (the Ruhrgebeid, with its steel and coal
industries). But even within these cities the polarization is being
intensified between the inner-city, the renovated neighbourhoods
and the suburbs, and the newly-constructed apartment complexes and
the old neighbourhood, in the latter at least some structural
appreciation is possible, just as in all old neighbourhoods.
     Yuppification is, therefore, not merely a material problem for
the Left, but also an ideological one. Precisely because the
boundaries are fluid, autonomes find themselves using computers,
citizens initiatives become dubious, often unknowingly, because of
their calls for restraint, and people in the Alternative List, with
their 'realist' politics, redraw the boundaries between the die-
hard yuppies on the one hand, and they, the leftists on the other.

As a fourth point we would like to mention the return of the
socialist countries into the capitalist market: At the moment, this
is a dynamic process, full of surprises. For that reason, we won't
offer any definite prognosis. Anything is possible. Alongside the
re-capitalization of Poland and Hungary and maybe even be East
Germany, the Soviet Union, and perhaps also Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, and, finally, Romania, and then the secession of the
Soviet Republics.
     West Germany itself, either reunited with the East or with
East Germany as its colony will be in a position to spread its
political and economic hegemony throughout large sections of south-
central and eastern Europe, aided, no doubt, by the process of
European unity. Eastern Europe is, of course, an area ripe for
investors who are seeking relief from flooded markets in the cities
and the failed development schemes in the Third World. And since
the opening of the borders, West Berlin is in danger of no longer
be able to be a haven for victims of Germany's social system. The
sub-culture here, like nowhere else, could quickly be destroyed by
increased investments and the restructuring into an economic
metropolis. All combined, this could be a process with dire
consequences for the Left in West Germany, replacing what once was
a system of long-enduring change with cataclysmic dynamism.
     Even if the existing socialist states of the past few years
has ceased being focal points for Western leftist movements, they
were, nonetheless, the supporters of liberation movements in the
Third World, and, merely through their existence, they also
dampened the belief in the omnipotence of capitalism. In a phase of
a lack of political perspective and of reformist illusions, the
sell-out of the socialist states has heightened the crisis on the
Left. Worse still than the economic encroachment of capitalism into
what was once socialist territory is that these encroachments have
carried with them a very definite political ideology. Together with
the dashed hopes of the liberation movements of the Third World
(failed military insurrections in El Salvador and Chile; regression
into dictatorship, Stalinism, and genocide in Cambodia, Iran, and
China; the politically failed revolution in Portugal) has come a
general loss of hope of finding a utopia on the Left, meaning a
return of politics to mere day-to-day concerns. This is a situation
in which our position is definitely that of a minority, and this
can't be covered over either with the projected hopes of the
proletarian masses or with the peace/environmentalist movement's
idea that "we number in the millions and are growing stronger every
day" or with the projected hope of foreign liberation struggles.
This means realizing that we are a minority, a minority that is
itself affected by society's structures, and a liberation struggle
must be waged both within this system, and from without.
     Where political expectations seem unfounded, and when we
realize how little we have actually, as yet, achieved, while at the
same time the economic situation worsens and the compulsion to
labour is intensified, then the function of the Left given
Germany's reality seem outdated. Indeed, they force the Left into
a situation of sectarian squabble. It's no wonder then that former
leftists, given these realizations, have accepted posts of
leadership.
     A new political and economic elite is formed, and these will
always be a thorn in the side of the Left. The confrontation with
them, therefore, must become one of the primary focuses of leftist
politics in the coming years. This should allow us to clear things
up, though we must, at the same time, not force ourselves into
isolation (Kreuzberg, May 1), but rather use our energies against
the common enemy.

Apocalypse - No Longer?

     Why was the Left so taken aback by the political processes in
the socialist states? The taken-for-granted Stalinism in the East
Bloc, and the disappearing of that system there as an eye-opening
perspective for changes here, could offer some explanation. Even
the best of prophets could not have predicted the coming into being
of such a political dynamic, which arose out of relationships which
were barely able to even withstand the existing repression.
     Another possible explanation lies in the 'perspectives' of the
Left in the 80's. "The expected battlefield is the Middle East, but
it could just as easily be West Germany or Eastern Europe, seeing
how long a war has already been contemplated against the Soviet
Union; after the Pershings and the cruise missiles, after numerous
internal regulations have been put into place, etc., the plan-
making still goes on here." (communique after an attack on the
Green Beret training ground in Bad Toelz, May '86, Radikal 132/1).
Everyone in the peace movement, from the civilians right up to the
autonomes and the RAF, expected the same thing: the big war, the
Apocalypse. And there was much evidence to support this fear: the
stockpile of arms, the verbal militarism of certainly the USA
government, the military interventions in Grenada, Lebanon, Iran,
Libya, and also the Iran-Iraq war. Today, only three and a half
years after the above cited communique, and only 6 years after the
stationing of missiles, everything seems totally different: just
about all conflicts are escalated by the superpowers themselves
(Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua), liberation organizations are
entering into negotiations or are being stalled (El Salvador, South
Africa), the Iran-Iraq war is over, and the Pershings and the
cruise missiles are being dismantled. The 'hawks' are signing
accords. The Left is standing, gaping in amazement, and tiresomely
repeating its claims of '83, although leftists themselves no longer
believe these fears.
     Even the Left has interpreted this detente as an independent
goal, the action of a single war-loving machine or its rulers, and
not as a means toward some other goal. (That which is not being
struggled against is the fact that this system, dependent on
oppression and exploitation, is one which operates on the basis of
irrationality and even provokes wars which do more harm than good
objectively). Included among the very few articles which explain
the arms race of the 80's as arising from the dynamic of crisis and
war is the article "In a Time of Danger and Crisis, the Middle-Road
Brings Death", published by the Revolutionary Cells in '83 (No, it
wasn't us): "The much bemoaned escalation of the East-West conflict
has been incorrectly analyzed as a break from and counter-point to
the preceding period of detente; but if we look closer, we can see
its actual consequences and means. The goal of the established
imperialist powers is, in the first place, the shameless
penetration into the East Bloc for the purpose of paying for the
costs of restructuring here at home, not, as is commonly supposed,
the military destruction of the East."
     This politic has largely achieved its goals at present: the
capitalist penetration into and the ideological demise of the East
Bloc are well under way. It is possible to explain the present
period of detente as one which will last as long as the East Bloc
and the Third World allow themselves to be submissive and/or the
capitalist growth continues.
     The Left, which has been preoccupied with opposing the arms
race, weapons systems, and military operations, rather than the
capitalist system itself which is responsible for war, is now left
without an answer to or explanation for these 'peaceful'
developments.
     And the flip-side of the arms race, namely the economic
effects of overcoming an economic crisis, is hardly considered.
"The position of arms manufacturers within industrialized societies
(such as West Germany) will only become more strengthened and
legitimized by the decrease in international tensions, which were
the results of an economic crisis. The U.S. is playing a great role
in this: the so-called 'right-wing-Keynesian' concept of a gigantic
enlargement of the national debt through enormous amounts of
defense spending was a cornerstone of Reagan's economic policy. At
the cost of a high national debt, along with a rising dollar and a
drastic trade imbalance, this policy stabilized the American
economy at the beginning of the 80's, while at the same time the
world economy became destabilized. But the American defense
industry has recently set its eyes upon a new goal, namely large
subsidies for high-tech industries, which would strengthen American
competitiveness in this market and regain advantages lost to other
producers. But a high price must be paid for this type of
industrial-politics. For a potential spin-off from the weapons
industry, much larger financial means must be employed than for
comparable developments in the civilian-technological industries.
And the total economic side-effects are drastic indeed... "When
seen in its totality, the question remains whether the
intensification of the defense industry and of weapons production
in general - even given capitalist relations - are the best means
of stimulating advances in technology. The technological progress
in Japan, in light of the dramatic declines in the U.S., seems to
indicate the answer is negative." (Hirsch/Roth)
     In any case, the weapons industry is a significant economic
factor, one which will, despite an intense process of disarmament,
remain at a very high level, even when cuts in defense spending
become imminent (ie. cuts in the SDI budget to help relieve the
debt). And on the other side, pressure from the peace and anti-war
movements, coupled with a decline in fears about military
conflicts, will lead to pressures for reducing military research.
Thus this must be another cause for the anti-modernizing Left.
     Even within the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, this
Apocalypse-fear was prevalent (when we look upon the anti-nuclear
movement, we see an extraordinary phenomenon, namely that the
radical segments of the movement defined themselves for a long time
with this apocalyptic fear in mind). While the citizen-oriented
side of the movement concentrated on dangers of radioactivity, the
radical wings felt that the possibility of constructing atomic
weapons which could threaten the East was reason enough to oppose
atomic energy. And up to this day, people within the radical
movements are surprised by the fact that their arguments were
largely accepted by the citizens'-groups. This realization caused
these groups to abandon the feeling that 'we are all victims', but
it did not force them to construct an analysis of the established
system. They could, just like the citizens'-groups, explain the
building of atomic weapons as simply the continuing plan of cold-
war enemies, and not the result of an economic crisis.
     The present lack on the Left of attaching any significance to
ecological questions can probably be explained due to the fact that
the feared prediction of a deforested, radioactively-poisoned,
cement-filled world had not come true (at least, not yet), and that
catastrophes have become a part of every-day life. Consequences of
this in the field of health care are readily becoming apparent,
slowly and in an individualized fashion, namely in the rise of
incidences of cancer and allergies and other sicknesses. What's
more, the environment is a cause which new, green-groups would like
to reduce to mere a ecological problem, a problem which could be
dealt with their ecological-capitalism, though needing the support
of a radical wing. It will indeed be interesting to see if the
forward-looking capitalism of someone like Joscka Fischer (of the
Green-Alternative List) can survive given the short-term demands of
industry. Presumably, this will only succeed if the Fischer-types
can 'present' some form of alternatives to the unavoidable deline
in certain industrial tasks.
     The Left, however, must not concede that simply because
capitalism gave rise to the environmental movement, that it must
simply remain a typical theme for the middle-class. That's why,
considering this is far from an exhausted issue, whether or not
eco-capitalism can survive, and considering the developments in
West Berlin seem to indicate that it can, the Left can't write this
matter off altogether. Especially here in West Berlin, in the last
few months ther have been several issues which should allow us to
question the red-green city government, namely the question of the
electricity network, the Schering affair (in connection with gene-
technology and Third World groups), the border crossing at
Schikauweg, a car-free inner-city, etc.
     The fixation on the Apocalypse has prevented the Left from
taking seriously the economic developments of the last few years;
the Left kept its outlook firmly focused on the end of the world,
or at least focused on the military aspects of the established
system, while, in the meantime, the reality of people's normal,
daily lives has been totally rearranged. This fatal error, namely
failing to develop one's politics from out of the perspective of
daily life, but rather as a reaction to the military posture of the
enemy, which normally results in a subjective view of the enemy, is
still being committed.
     With the exception of the Hafenstrasse and the May 1st
celebrations in Kreuzberg, the party-conferences and manifestations
of the neo-nazi's have become the primary rallying-points for
militant opposition. However, whenever anti-fascist groups long for
an anti-capitalist resistance against the housing crisis, rent, or
two-tiered social systems, these desires remain as words and are
not translated into actions. When fascist groups are only opposed
militaristically, instead of exposing the bare reality of their
politics, then it is very easy for those groups to present
themselves as the 'victims'. Nazi's and their potential
sympathizers are, after all, human, and thus they must be dealt
with in a different manner than a nuclear power plant. If militant
anti-fascism only is militant IN APPEARANCE only, then the citizen
complaint of the anti-fascist movement proves true, namely that
militant resistance only plays into the hands of the right-wing.
     To give another example: here in Berlin, we still have not
developed an effective structure to resist evictions at the hands
of the red-green city council, even though many folks are already
anxiously awaiting Bush's visit (or next year's May 1st). Here the
point is also relevant, namely holding on to symbols which no
longer speak to reality, because Bush is the head of an American
State preoccupied, not with military, but rather with economic
expansion. The question again: why this belief in an Apocalypse on
the Left, why are we always making out the enemy to be more
invulnerable than it really is? This is worthy of an independent
investigation, since we can't offer any sufficient answer.
     We maintain that militant politics all-too-often wields a
citizen's conception of resistance, albeit concealed in an anti-
capitalist veneer. Usually only those matters are attacked wherein
the state holds its own, self-defined ethical norms of freedom and
humanity in contempt; daily, structural violence is not sufficient
legitimation for militant resistance. What's more, we get the
feeling that the commonly-expressed angst of the Apocalypse is,
actually, a secret-longing for its arrival. When power structures
have become so firmly entrenched, then the individual sufferings
need to be explained as collective experiences.

The Left As An (Ex-) Categorical Imperative

     When we look past the facade of the ever-recurring slogans of
leftist pamphlets and demonstrations, then we must conclude that
rarely have we had such troubled times internally as at present.
The individualization of not only the decision of whether or not to
enter into resistance but also of simply daily affairs has
decreased dramatically. Our longing for happiness is privatized,
and resistance is merely a means of securing the material
advantages which can guarantee this. This helps us to explain why
so many groups come and go. This reason is that the expectations
and needs in these groups are at odds with past experience. Many of
these groups are in danger of simply becoming liberators of the
desires of others. If they can't do this, then they are curtly
abandoned in favour of trying to realize a collective gratification
of one's own expectations given the established social conditions.
Remaining within the leftist scene really comes out of the
realization that remaining gives more satisfaction. The Left as a
categorical imperative? Of course, we could naturally, from this
contention, exclusively rely on our own experiences, but even this
is a sign of regression. The notion that 'everyone is the maker of
her/his own happiness' has even been accepted within leftist
circles; except for the most important exception, namely that
patriarchal structures and behaviour patterns must be openly
discussed with an eye to changing them, individual conflicts are no
longer placed in a wider context.
     Also on this topic a longer discussion paper needs to be
written. We ourselves have always had difficulties with this,
namely to express in words this great emptiness of broken
collectivity. At the same time, the question of the situation
within leftist groups (individual and political) is of vital
importance in the search for a militant, illegal perspective,
during a time when things are going badly on the Left. To put this
another way: is our initiative not just an altered version of
exactly the same militant subjectivism which we earlier criticized
in the autonome-groups? The eternal revolt of here-and-now instead
of being persuaded by an analysis of the objective power-
structures?
     Firstly, this is certain: "only in struggle does the moment of
unanimity exist" (see "Kamalatta"). (The reverse of this, namely
that unanimity is necessarily the result of struggle, has been
proven false on many occasions). What this means is that it is
bullshit to try and work out all internal difficulties and problems
before entering into the struggle.
     Secondly, the relationship between theory and praxis is not a
linear one, but a dialectical one. That means: resistance comes
into being, not when the entire leftist movement arrives at a
common strategy which then only needs to be carried out in
practice, nor when a unique, historical opportunity is provided,
out of which resistance springs up automatically. We can't sit
around and wait for the moment that the entire leftist movement
comes together and begins working on an anti-modernist political
agenda. For one thing, we lack the necessary structures that would
allow such a discussion process to take place in the first place.
What we can do is to stimulate discussion through actions. Now we
arrive at the question whether actions are productive or counter-
productive. For example, the Kuebel-action: this action could never
have been the initiative of the autonome scene alone (the consensus
was never large enough, nor was the level of militancy high enough,
to force the 'Maxwell' to close), but because of the fact that the
place had to be closed down, the action unleashed a great deal of
discussion.
     Thirdly, the militant-left, which actually brings about no
militant praxis, is not militant. Militant action has always
derived its legitimacy, not only from the fact that the state and
capital won't disband of their own accord, nor will they be
persuaded with nice words, but rather militancy is also needed in
the form of self-liberation, as a breakthrough into internalized
power-structures. "One who breaks no laws is broken by the laws."
That's why it's important that we develop a politics that makes use
of relevant militant actions even in times of political calm. If we
don't do this, then this need - which is a common need on the Left
- either will be gratified by politically counter-productive points
or will aggressively seek an outlet within leftist circles
themselves.
     Our fourth point is that whenever the analysis is correct,
such as the fact that post-Fordism is expanding the process of
individualization, it will become even more difficult to form a
mass-militant movement.
     In the production sector, the classical model of the factory
is either disappearing altogether or being redefined by the
housewife, rationalization, increased control possibilities, and
the continual replacement of personnel. Logistical advantages
(including space) for organizing resistance, such as in the factory
battles in Italy or France and during the few wild-cat strikes here
in Germany, are disappearing. What's more, everyone is becoming
increasingly dependent on their jobs, and the consequences for
speaking out, such as risking one's place in the labour market, are
becoming more severe. Even in the reproductive sector it's becoming
harder to organize resistance. The re-organizing of neighbourhoods
is destroying space-structures outright. What's more, freedom in
the reproductive sphere, which sometimes is the only way of getting
resistance started, is being reduced by the coercion to labour.
     Whenever the organizational conditions of organizing
resistance become changed, it's not possible to stick with old
concepts. If flexibilized workers have a way of life which already
makes resistance impossible, then they are obviously in no position
themselves to counter-act this plan.
     When the social re-organization is complete, it won't be
possible to motivate yuppies around neighbourhood issues and thus
the resistance capability of that entire neighbourhood is zero. The
hot-beds of resistance, those few places where leftist politics is
still seen as a power-factor, are, not surprisingly, those
neighbourhoods where this process of re-organization is in full
swing, neighbourhoods which the powers-that-be see as the
inheritors of a political legacy from past movements, such as
places which attempted to stop this social re-organization, like
Berlin (Kreuzberg) and Hamburg for example. Even places like the
Rhein-Main district (Frankfurt), which were once centres of the
movement, are now dormant. And we won't even mention the high-tech
metropoles in southern Germany. The article from Unzertrennlich
gives a perfect analysis of this evolutionary process which
transformed a small, revolutionary city into a centre of high-tech
industry. But on the question of organizing resistance, they miss
something: "The point which we can seize and use for organizing
resistance is the uncertainty and sense of crisis which accompanies
the present restructuring process." Firstly, what they call
"crisis", namely cutting off parts of the social network, is not
actually a crisis, but rather an integral part of the post-Fordist
system. Secondly, it is wrong to count on a crisis to spawn a
resistance, and finally the question of communism/anarchism is
again reduced to the question of how to drag yourself out of
economic misery. "Even in Freiburg, the situation will lead to
breakdowns, contradictions, and resistance against contemporary
politics." (Can the lowest of the social strata be kept quiet with
a process of repression and an argument for resignation, for being
content with what you already have?) "Therefore, we hereby separate
ourselves from the idea of a revolution surfacing out of a united
Left and instead act upon our notorious expectations of an
autonomous, fighting movement, spawned from its own social
necessity alongside of which the Left can and must find its place."
     This brings up the question of whether this destroys any
'hope' we might have. In other words, how can a mass-movement
against post-Fordism come into being when the individual people,
who are part of the mass, have become so individualized, and when
knowledge of the history of the Left, of the possibilities and
chances for resistance, is destroyed, and when State repression is
able to completely squash any few remnants of resistance?
     The Left, therefore, cannot operate on the premise that such
politics of resistance will find itself in relevant surroundings.
Contemporary, uncoordinated squatting actions in West Berlin and in
other German cities are going blindly in that direction, and a
simultaneous process of economic as well as political
marginalization is taking place. (Or are we again finding ourselves
in the midst of a banal generation gap, wherein the experience and
knowledge of one generation is not adequately passed on to the
next?)
     Our fifth point is that post-Fordism is still in its social-
consolidation phase, in other words, the ideological, economic, and
repressive measures of today are creating much heavier disturbances
than the accustomed minor disturbances of years past (there's
little point in speculating about the past, but it's still
intriguing to wonder how Fordism would have progressed had a
massive resistance been in place when the first Ford production
line came into being).
     Obviously, post-Fordism cannot act as a permanent solution for
the ills of capitalism. To name but a few examples: because the
East Bloc will be made economically dependant, imperialism will
necessarily reach its limits; the expanding sectors of high-tech
and gene-technology will become saturated; the contradictions of
falling wages and welfare benefits and the need for a rise in
purchasing power will only be temporarily resolved.
     But a stabilized form of post-Fordism will, either through
freezes or through an institutionalized ability to create
conflicts, be in a position to sort out these contradictions.
That's why the Left can't afford to place all its hope in a
resistance coming into being in the long-term and why it can't
afford to sit around and wait until its theoretical cadre, who will
have already fallen years behind reality, are in a position to
fully interpret the whole process.

An Approaching Fascism And A Post-Fordist Contradiction?

     One contradiction which stands in the way of a calm, social-
democratic approach to halting post-Fordism is the present
resurgence of fascism. Within but a single year, the Republikaner
have become a potent political party in West Germany; talk about
re-unification is finally being taken seriously; and the recent
scenes around the Berlin Wall made one think of the past, because
the people who were tearing down the wall didn't think of
themselves as members of any party, but solely as Germans.
     The question of whether fascism is in contradiction with
capitalist development is a favoured one on the Left. We believe
that the present developments in capital are objectively necessary,
even if these developments partially harm capital itself. "The
capitalist system of the 'free West' hasn't had to justify its
production for the last 40 years. But now it needs a justification,
and precisely because there isn't one, it has to channel all of its
ideological and social-organizational energies to contain future
conflicts, revolts, destructions, and battles. The only radical
fighting-ideology which is suited for imperialism is that of
fascism, sexism, racism, and nationalism" (RZ). Thus, the present
resurgence of fascism is necessary, because the lowest of the three
social strata won't stay calm enough to solve things in a social-
democratic or orange-green fashion. Despite this, the rise in
fascism could be seen as an economic timebomb. It could be more
expensive to wholly engulf East Germany, considering the subsidy
monies which would be required, than if East Germany were merely
retained as a colony; and even channelled conflicts are better than
no conflicts, and, above all, they give the chance to build up a
reformed leftist power.
     It's difficult to assess what level of struggle against
fascists and fascism can be waged without questioning the
capitalist system itself. This lack of questioning will result,
however, if the struggle is exclusively waged against those fascist
groups which are already marginalized from society. At the moment,
the struggle against fascist, sexist, racist, and nationalist
ideology is of a greater importance, precisely because these ideas
are in danger of becoming intertwined with the general notion of
the common-good. That is why this struggle must be waged by putting
the slogan "behind fascism lies capitalism" into practice.

RZ: Still Dispelling Myths!!

     At the end of this article, a German name is attached. Even if
this name is not protected by law, it is still the mark of a
leftist organization to which certain expectations are connected.
We have carefully chosen this name: it stands for a politics which
relates its militant, illegal actions to the state of the movement
in general without being affected by the ups and downs of the
movement, a politics which combines theory and action and which
develops a continuity. Even though we were clear from the start
that we did not count ourselves among the guerrilla diffusa of
autonome action groups, it took some time, nonetheless, before we
decided upon this name.
     That's not only because of the increased risk of legal
investigation, but also because of all the myths surrounding "RZ".
This myth-formation can be explained through the tendency of
leftist people not to involve themselves in a form of struggle
which entails personal risks. So why the myth-forming, which
naturally excludes these people themselves? People in the
resistance are made out to be "ubermenschen" and their methods are
considered impossible to imitate.
     Other Revolutionary Cells have been busy, but it seems that
the questions surrounding the notion of armed struggle itself has
become more important than the dissemination of the existing
communiques.
     But RZ is in danger of becoming just a myth if actions are
merely carried out without concern for their political content.
This seems to be the case, at least, in the campaign against
auslander- and refugee -politics. Apart from the physical damage
inflicted upon the Berlin refugee office and the Cologne centre for
the registration of foreigners, these attacks seem to have had
little political effect. When one Revolutionary Cell once again
made the point in a recent attack (May 9, 1989) on the court houses
in Muenster and Dusseldorf that the campaign ought to be taken up
by the entire autonome and social-revolutionary movement, it became
sadly obvious that the movement as a whole was not going to react.
And if you all maintain, "we have never fostered the illusion that
segments of the proletarian youth, women, unemployed, and other
groups in society would immediately find common cause with refugees
and immigrants, because racism and sexism are too deeply ingrained
for that. Anti-imperialism must begin by breaking through in these
areas.", then that still does not answer the question, How?, and
the campaign remains ineffective.
     It would definitely be worth while to look into this more
deeply. But at the moment we don't really want to write more about
this, because the discussion of the attacks which took place is
primarily the responsibility of those who worked on the attacks.
We're not concerned with insinuating ourselves into some nice
little leftist past-time; on the one hand we have people who
continually carry out militant politics just to be reproached for
not concerning themselves with theory, and then we have the rest of
the people who are such an apathetic lot (who get a kick out of
analyzing themselves from the outside while sitting in a bar). On
the contrary, our goal is to stimulate discussions within Cell,
that is, leftist circles, to avoid the problem of making internal
contradictions known only after a campaign has finished (for more
on this, see the "Startbahn Discussion Piece"). The Cells need to
shed some of their surrounding mysticism and thereby add to the
process of expanding the movement by making their internal
political convictions more understandable.
     But still, there is something positive in the myth. The high
expectations surrounding an RZ-project, at least as far as theory,
practical completion, and continuity are concerned, have enabled us
to express our (revolutionary) impatience in the form of actions.
So we have finally reached a time externally when we are now able
to address the above points. This hasn't been the case with other
projects; perhaps they just fell short. A continually open
discussion could lead to both a high level of discussion as well as
action, especially if other groups don't fall apart in a phase
wherein groups leave their theoretical development wholly up to
themselves.
     We also became stuck on two other points when we decided to
become part of RZ.
     The first is, we still aren't clear as to what the exact
relationship is between the various, individual Cells; in other
words, how is a common politics formed? Of course, each Cell is
autonomous and the name is not limited to just the 'core-cells'.
Nonetheless, the seeming division, which the Justice Department
aids in making, between 'core-cells' and 'resonance cells' is not
without some basis. Because it is, of course, easier for the
somewhat larger cell structures to formulate theoretical proposals
and to carry these out in practice, whereas the smaller cells can
just follow along these given lines.
     We would like to see groups from the old RZ take a critical
look at their past (for example, why hasn't the RZ-concept become
more widespread?) and propose some means of democratization, at
least as far is feasible given State repression.
     The second point is, that we have some difficulties with some
RZ actions from the past, especially with the involvement in the
high-jacking to Entebbe. Of course, those days are now past, when
high-jackings were an instrument of the militant Left, so we
needn't fear a repeat. Still one has to wonder why the only mention
of this event in the book 200 Years RZ is a tribute to those RZ'ers
who died in action. As far as we know, no RZ text exists which
takes a critical look at this action.
     Even in the lowest of times, deeds must take place. This is
part of our conceptual plan. Again: the situation on the Left is,
at present, rather poor, even on the militant wing. What we are
lacking is both a mass-movement as well as militancy. Whenever a
solution is sought for in a militant mass, the same vicious circle
comes to light again: no actions are taken, because there isn't a
mass of people willing to act, because a lack of undertaken actions
has resulted in lack of practical perspectives. Here again we see
post-Fordism at work through political integration (for example,
the Green-Alternative List and the restating of leftists' demands
and politics in terms acceptable to the capitalists) and through
the process of individualization (increased pressure to work,
micro-electronics, centralized factories, pleasant jobs).
     Regaining our ability to define ourselves politically (in
other words, to force other social groups to redefine themselves
according to the demands of the Left) and regaining the fighting
spirit which we need to carry on won't come about either through
theoretical discussions, nor with spontaneous moments of mass-
militancy. Growing from out of a weak position is only possible
with a mixture of provocative actions coupled with theoretical
positions which expose the ideological reality of our enemy while
not, at the same time, bringing us into discredit among those we
hope to influence.
     Here an historical example comes to mind: the climax of the
'68-movement was not so much reached as a result of the theoretical
discussions which took place after Rudi Dutschke was shot. Before
all of this, for example, there was the poster action, when illegal
posters against the Vietnam War were spread all over West Berlin.
Although such an action is really nothing special these days, at
the time, it had the perfect political effect: within the SDS, a
process of politicization resulted after the action, while not
hindering principled agreement. The negative public opinion drew
great media attention, resulting in an increase of membership in
discussion groups which had previously been quite small. The same
applies for the egg-attack on the America House. Our plan also goes
a little ways in this direction, on another scale of course, and
adapted to the some 20-year old history of militant struggle in
West Berlin and Germany. That's why we intend to inflict serious
economic damage upon the ideological protagonists of post-Fordism.
     We expect the following:

1. We need to break through the obvious lack of criticism of micro-
electronics and yuppie-culture which has so deeply pervaded the
Left; we want the Left to come to recognize its own guilty
conscience.

2. Given the decentralization which has taken place in many small
companies, it should be fairly easy to completely shut down certain
firms. Even branches of high-tech firms are somewhat more flexible
when it comes to relocation than are branches of other, more
traditional industries. In the long term, we would like to add to
the destabilization of the investment climate in West Berlin, where
investments are currently on the rise.

3. We would like to partially reverse the trend on the Left of
lacking perspective and a willingness to act.

     Our own strengths in this process are, of course, limited; a
cell can only realistically carry out a few actions per year.
Nonetheless, we hope to have an effect. The political possibilities
of illegal actions are often over-estimated by those carrying out
actions and under-estimated by the opponents of action. We want to
more closely examine this. Illegal actions can achieve a
continuity, and thereby unleash a process which makes the enemy
feel uneasy. What actions can't do, however, is replace political
dynamics and discussions within the mass-movement. And they also
mustn't lead to an independent culture. What they can do is go
farther than the mass-movement and the Left as a whole can. If we
are limited in Kiez, then we can go to Gruenewald; if, despite
years of discussion, too few people show up at a demonstration
against genetic technology, then we can always pick up the slack;
if squatters can't themselves take actions against developers
because they are always under surveillance, then perhaps it is
possible for us to act.
     The problem remains, however, that the realization of this
concept into a broad, politically effective method is still only
feasible in leftist bastions such as Hamburg and Berlin, where
illegal actions are not isolated events, but are rather widely
discussed. The question remains whether this concept can be carried
out in smaller cities, or in cities where post-Fordism is already
more advanced, namely in Muenchen or Stuttgart.
     But it is clear that the present state of apathy, waiting for
others to seize the initiative, or the taking of mini-actions is
not acceptable. Maybe this attempt offers a solution, to confront
the regional process of restructuring by coming together in the
open in mass-militant protest, and letting this be coupled with
illegal actions. But this isn't the place to decide that, rather,
it must come out of a process of discussion. And this discussion is
desperately needed.
     This concept states exactly the drawback of limiting the
revolution to Kiez (see the discussion piece, "From Riot to
Revolution").
     It's important to set up counter-powers in our own
neighbourhoods to hinder the eventual process of social
restructuring. The problem is, will each small capitalist be
willing to lose his/her job, especially if no counter-structures
are in place? Where can we buy/steal things, for example, if stores
like Kaiser's move out?
     This point makes it clear that the development of poorer
neighbourhoods is not independent of the development of richer
areas. An attack on Benny in Kiez doesn't harm the high-tech
producers in Charlottenburg and Wilmarsdorf. Building a gymnasium
in Kreuzberg does not affect the expensive establishments in
Schoeneberg. What we see in So. 36 are the symptoms, the cause is
the economic development, which is taking place primarily in city-
centres. Yuppification and the increase in numbers of sports
facilities are the results are the results of two different
concepts: 'revaluing' and 'renovation' respectively, of which only
one can continue.
     As for us, for each independent action we shall write a full
discussion piece, in which all of the above will be considered,
bearing in mind actual developments. Above all, we are counting on
reactions to this article, whereby we already are aware of the
folks in the above-described weak structures, who often out of
being pressed for time offer no replies, and then only react when
actions force them to voice their opinion.
     We were forced to be vague in the last part of this article.
What comes of this shall be revealed in our praxis. We are counting
on a fruitful discussion, which will bring the possibility of
another way of life that much closer to us all.

Revolutionary Cells, November 1989