GRAPO: The Resistance That Never Ends

     The Groups of Anti-Fascist Resistance, First of October
(GRAPO) is not the first leftist organization that has taken up
arms to confront the regime under which we live. We must remember
that since the insurrection of Asturias in 1934, going into the
civil war and the guerrilla war of the 1940's and 50's, as a
practical matter, armed struggle has not ceased in Spain. Or, as
the expert "informer" and vice president of Group 16, Alesandro
Munoz Alonso says: "Francoism had to deal with terrorist
manifestations from the first moment." As this phenomenon is
nothing new, GRAPO declares that they are "the inheritors of that
anti-fascist armed struggle in the new economic, political, and
social conditions in Spain", and have become an enemy especially
feared and persecuted by the powers that be.
     GRAPO made its appearance in a crucial moment of Spanish
political life: in 1975, when the fascist regime was going through
one of the most serious crises of its history. Faced with the
bankruptcy of its "opening" policy (which were the first steps to
adapt the state apparatus to new conditions under which fascist
methods were being shown to be inefficient), its social isolation,
the boycott and the workers struggles breaking out everywhere, the
oligarchy resorted to even more unrestrained state terrorism.
Throughout the summer of that year, known as the "summer of
terror", the repression cost several lives, it produced numerous
round-ups and detentions, the first "anti-terrorist" law was put
into operation (which would be maintained and developed by the UCD
and PSOE governments), and initiated a whole series of very summary
processes. On September 27, in the middle of the wave of protest
demonstrations running throughout Europe, 5 anti-fascist patriots
were shot with the objective of stopping the mass movement as well
as showing that the regime was invulnerable and that any resistance
was futile. But four days later, on October 1st, when Franco and
his followers were celebrating the shootings in Plaza De Oriente,
four policemen were shot to death by various commandos in different
parts of Madrid. The executors of these actions were the Groups of
Anti-Fascist Resistance who took the name of that first of October
and whose first militants had come from the ranks of the PCE(r) -
Communist Party of Spain, Reconstituted.
     The actions on that October 1st made the regime retreat, it
was made to stop its terrorist escalation (more than 20, summary
processes with death penalty petitions were suspended) and it
changed the orientation of its "opening" process.
     On July 3, 1976, Adolfo Suarez, is named president of
government, assuring in a speech that "the feeling of the reform
(initiated by Arias Navarro) will not change but the manner of
putting it into practice will change." But Suarez's intentions
would find that on July 18, which continued to be the regime's
official day of celebration, GRAPO detonated over 30 bombs in
fascist monuments, places, and institutions all across the the
territorial state. A few days later after this wave of explosions,
another attack against similar objectives was launched. In one of
these attacks the first two deaths of GRAPO militants occurred when
the bomb they were going to place in the Palace of Justice in
Seville exploded prematurely. The militants of this organization
would later say: "The resistance has not only not been liquidated
by the new manoeuvres of the monopolies' regime, but from this
moment on, it will increase".
     And that is, in fact, what happened with the continual
"disarticulations" which were GRAPO's objectives. The regime found
that with each step that it took in its political manoeuvres (or as
its official spokesman would say, "progress on the path to
democratization"), these would be dynamited once and again and
"exposed in their significance of covering and strengthening
fascism" by GRAPO. The kidnapping of the President of the Council
of State Orial y Urquiso, and of the President of the Supreme
Council of Military Justice, Lt. General Villecusa, carried out in
December 1976 and January 1977 respectively, had special
importance. GRAPO gave these actions the name "Operation Chrome"
and carried them out with the objective of "the liberation of
political prisoners and the denunciation of the 'reforms' to
institutionalize and legalize fascism".
     The noted fact that their actions always coincided with key
political situations was thus explained by GRAPO: "A guerrilla
organization which wants to win the heart and active support of its
people cannot simply limit itself to striking, it should also know
when, where, and how to strike. Because of that our military
operations have responded in each moment to the political
necessities of the mass movement: responding to fascist crimes,
denouncing the electoral masquerade and the permanence of fascism,
to encourage and support the masses in their resistance struggle
against the monopolies' exploitation and oppression..." Thus, for
example, the action carried out in the last weeks of January 1977
against various policemen and civil guards was done "in response to
the murders of pro-amnesty demonstrators Arturo Ruiz and Mari Luz
Najera, and to the Atocha street massacre of labour lawyers in
Madrid."
     In 1977 with "Operation Chrome" and later in the summer many
important militants of the organization fell. Along with the
relentless police repression, the media orchestrated an entire
symphony of silence and incredible interpretations "to destroy the
image of the terrorist's organization and with that make very
difficult its implantation among the working classes", according to
Juan Tomas De Salas, president of Group 16. But, despite all that,
GRAPO continued to carry out all kinds of actions, among which can
be mentioned for its repercussions, the action carried out in an
armoury in which 500 kilos of explosives were expropriated on
September 27 and which cost the life of police captain Florentino
Herquedas, who had directed one of the execution platoons in the
firing squads of September 27, 1975; or the bombing actions done in
solidarity with the imprisoned Red Army Fraction militants of West
Germany, or the imprisoned ETA militants in France.

A Tactic Of Armed Struggle For An Anti-Fascist Strategy

     In 1978, GRAPO analyzed its experiences and published a
booklet called "Experiences of Three Years of Struggle", in which
they cover their objectives as well as the tactical and strategic
principles which orient and guide their activity.
     For GRAPO, "The guerrilla war by itself, separated from the
resistance movement, or above it, if it is not led by the working
class would strike blindly and eventually be annihilated".
According to GRAPO, "The working class with its party in the
vanguard is the leading and directing force of our revolution, it
is the firmest and clearest sector and as such it is the one called
on to lead and direct the revolution; the unity of the resistance
includes the guerrilla". For GRAPO, this is a strategic principle
and on it they base their political relationship with the PCE(r),
which helps them in their analysis and in their ideological
orientation. On their part, the PCE(r), through the presence and
political work of the communists who have integrated themselves
into the armed organization - organically both organizations are
totally independent - give it a class base and direction and ensure
its proletarian political and ideological direction "for the
correct development of the guerrilla's activities".
     For GRAPO, "Because of the existance of fascism along with the
consequent lack of real liberties and the super-exploitation that
we have seen and still see the proletariat and the wide popular
masses submitted to, the main contradiction operating in the
Spanish state is that which confronts the people against fascism
and the monopolies." This contradiction determines GRAPO's
strategic program, which has an anti-fascist, anti-monopolist, and
anti-imperialist character.
     To achieve these objectives GRAPO has elaborated a strategy of
prolonged people's war "adapted to the economic, social and
political conditions of Spain". For GRAPO, given the
characteristics of the Spanish state, in which they consider it to
be impossible to organize and educate the masses within the bounds
of legality, this accumulation of revolutionary forces can only be
realized "through the popular resistance movement which combines
the political struggle of the masses, strikes, demonstration, etc.,
with the armed guerrilla struggle practised by small groups".
     According to GRAPO, the popular forces now find themselves in
a strategic defensive phase as the monopolist state can count on a
strong centralized repressive apparatus with relatively powerful
means and considerable imperialist support, while the popular
forces are relatively weak. That is from where the resistance
movement is speaking. This occurs on a general or strategic level.
"OK now", explains GRAPO, "on a tactical level it is the popular
forces, in reality, the guerrilla, which have the initiative and
hit the reactionaries where, when, and how it wants. That is how
the popular forces transform their strategic disadvantage into a
tactical advantage."

A Step Backwards

     1978 marks the changing point of the "transition to
democracy". The ruling powers, sunken in uncertainty and in a
profound weakness carry out the "transition" with the establishment
of a constitution. That was the year the strike movement reached
its highest point, producing very radicalized demonstrations in
Galicia, Adalucia, and above all, in Euskadi; there was even an
attempt to assault a barracks of the armed police in San Sebastian.
The crisis which had been dragging the regime down since the last
days of Franco was deepening. The "Suarista" policy was sinking,
and taking with it the reformists.
     Not withstanding that situation, GRAPO foresaw a period of
ebbing in the popular and workers movement which together with the
fact that they had become the main objective of police (and
journalistic) repression, would take them to analyze the new
conditions in which they would have to continue the struggle. Thus
in "Three Years of Experience of Struggle", they said: "But the
situation is not only changing for the better, aside from that we
must take into account a less favourable aspect for us; that the
enemy has learned and has more knowledge about us than when we
started. That makes it necessary to analyze that experience, but it
can be said that for a long time we will have to move under
conditions which will be favourable from a political viewpoint but
which will be relatively unfavourable from the aspect of organizing
our movement". These were the conditions which GRAPO foresaw
characterizing the period between 1979 and 1984.
     Before the situation of political weakness in which the regime
found itself, and in the face of the first symptoms of ebbing in
the workers movement, GRAPO and with the PCR(r) and other
organizations proposed a program to rekindle the fire, known as the
"Five Point Program, in which they picked out the democratic
aspirations most felt by the popular masses. This program contained
the following: 1) complete and general amnesty for all political
prisoners and exiles. Repeal of anti-terrorist law and other
repressive laws; 2) a purge of fascist elements from the repressive
groups, judiciary and other state institutions; 3) political and
union liberties with no restriction; 4) rejection of integration
into NATO and dismantling of foreign military bases; 5) dissolution
of the current parliament and the convening of truly free elections
and liberty for all parties and social groups to campaign and
freely defend, with no obstacles, their ideals and political
programs.
     This program was an apparent step backwards for GRAPO in
relation to their strategic objectives, but it was a step back
which in the future would allow them to take two steps forward. In
the first place it would allow for the polarizing of positions
(either with the regime or with the resistance) of a sector
becoming more numerous in our society and which demands real
changes in the state, and, secondly, it allowed for the possibility
of achieving a series of political gains which would facilitate
later advances by the popular resistance movement.
     In GRAPO's conception, the 5 Point Program was not merely a
propaganda program, but was first and foremost a flexible tactical
program to be utilized at its basic level; in that while it did not
modify the capitalist nature of the system, it did not abandon the
resistance struggle and the other struggles firmly and decisively
behind it. Because of this, all actions during 1979-1984 were
directed towards the implementation of this program. In a
communique announcing a wave of sabotage carried out in the early
hours of September 29, 1982 they said: "All of these actions (...)
are firmly fixed within the struggle for achieving the Five Point
Program". And effectively starting at the end of 1978, GRAPO would
have periods of maximum activity to impose this program, but would
also receive heavy blows. 1979 would have both these extremes.
     The first part of the year would be marked by a spate of
guerrilla activity unknown since the civil war. Among the many
actions of all kinds carried out by GRAPO were some as significant
as the assassination attempt against General Agustia Munoz Vazques,
the military leader who negotiated Spain's integration into NATO,
the assassination of Rodrigues Roman, Director General of the DGS
when in March 1976 the police in Vitoria machine-gunned a worker's
demonstration; the attack on the police commissar Beltan who was
known in Seville as the torturer of anti-fascist workers; the
blowing up of the Police Commissar for the central district of
Madrid, or the failed attempt against the Director General of Penal
Institutions, Garcia Valdes. 
     By contrast, in the second half of 1979, GRAPO received one of
the heaviest setbacks of its history, with over 30 militants
captured and the dismantling of laboratories and workshops for the
manufacture of explosives and other tools needed by the
organization. The government believed that with these captures it
had finished GRAPO, but a little later, on December 17, five
leaders of the organization escaped from Zamora prison. In a little
more than 6 months GRAPO once again had its workshops operating and
its commandos operating throughout the state territory.
     In 1982, the government of Valvo Sotelo was obligated, because
of GRAPO's activities which impeded its ability to rule, to give
the first steps to a negotiated solution which would save the
regime from the ruin threatening it. These steps lengthened until
the summer of 1983 when the PSOE government closed any avenues of
negotiation with its repressive policies and "repentance" policy.
The regime believed that with 10 million votes behind it the regime
could avoid having to make concessions and could so isolate and
liquidate the armed popular organizations.
     In 1984, the PSOEist government made its pro-monopolist and
imperialist policy very clear and it launched itself on a program
of state terrorism aimed at the extermination of all resistance.
Realizing that "the last reformist illusions of the masses have
disappeared, that the sold out parties and unions are in total
bankruptcy, that the worker and popular movements are ascending and
applying truly radical and revolutionary means of struggle..., and
that definitely the conditions that motivated and made possible the
5 Point Program have disappeared", GRAPO considered that era to be
closed, feeling that continuing to insist on negotiation of the
Program did not respond to real conditions and would only feed
false illusions and objectively slow down the popular resistance
movement.

Two Steps

     According to GRAPO, this resistance movement finds itself now
able to continue combat on a higher level and for more elevated
goals. That is why they no longer struggle "for some improvements
(...) but for the overthrow of the state of monopolies of the
fascist regime and for the installation of a regime of liberty in
which power resides in the people and they are the ones who
exercise it." Thus GRAPO again put their strategic program on the
first level.
     In relation to these objectives GRAPO renewed their activities
with a view not focused on the short term, as in the last period,
but with the goal of overcoming this prolonged defensive strategy
phase. Thus, for example, one of the immediate tasks they set out
on and began to put into practice is that of gaining a qualitative
leap in their self-financing, and doing so by means of charging a 
revolutionary tax. Another significant task they set out to realize
was that of consolidating and developing the guerrilla; not just
maintaining it, but establishing it as a central activity in
supporting, building, and developing the popular resistance
movement; to make it grow and at the same time grow with it. They
believe that to overthrow a modern capitalist state, such as the
Spanish regime, "a strong communist party, well rooted in the
proletariat, a broad mass movement with a revolutionary character
and a guerrilla army of the people are needed".

Sidebar:

15 dead casualties in the organization since 1976.
80 militants in prison.
2,000 sympathizers, approximately, have been detained and released
without charges in the last 10 years.
3,000 armed actions. Some 100 dead victims, more than a dozen
kidnappings, 1,700 bombings, over 1,000 expropriations.
100 businessmen and industrialists paid the revolutionary tax in
1984, the year it was initiated.

(Translators Note: This article first appeared in "Area Critica" in
1985.)